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The Role of Romania's Parliamentary Committee on European Affairs vis-a-vis National Implementation of European Union Policies
Romania joined the European Union on 1 January 2007, in spite of the European Commission, Parliament and Council receiving several warnings from domestic stakeholders that Romania was not quite ready for accession. Just as the December 1989 Romanian Revolution was the only blood-spilling departure from the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, the 2007 EU Accession is the most troublesome among the 12 new Member States. Within the past month, Romania's government coalition broke up and shifted significantly, from center-right to center-left, several ministers were sacked in spite of their glorious image in the international media, the cabinet portfolios were reduced by almost one third, and the Parliament started the impeachment procedure against the President. Domestic political quarrels clearly surpassed any and all concerns over the continuation of the integration process, the administrative and judiciary reforms, the fight against corruption, and/or the effective spending of structural funds. Under such circumstances, what are the prospects that Romania would effectively implement and enforce EU legislation and policies? The following pages analyze the Romanian Parliament's role in the process of national implementation of EU policies. The underlying assumption is that, in times of fierce political confrontations, only Parliament may be in position to reach consensus, make or break decisions, ultimately lead the way.
European Framework
According to Protocol 9 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, as initially annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, “all Commission consultation documents [. . .] shall be promptly forwarded to national parliaments of the Member States” (Article 1) and “Commission proposals for legislation [. . .] shall be made available in good time so that [each] national parliament receives them as appropriate” (Article 2). A six-week period is normally available for national parliaments to comment and/or otherwise intervene in the EU legislative process, in between two crucial moments highlighted in Article 3 of Protocol 9—a) the time when a proposal is made available, and b) the time when such proposal is placed on the decision-making agenda. Article 3 of Protocol 9, however, applies only to questions that concern police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Title VI of the Treaty on the European Union—TEU), if they follow the codecision procedure (Articles 251 and/or 252 of the Treaty establishing the European Community—TEC). In addition, Articles 4-7 of Protocol 9 allow for the national parliaments to contribute to the legislative process of the Union via the biannual Conferences of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union—COSAC.
Consulting the available information on the websites of the national parliaments, Secretariat General of the European Commission, COSAC and IPEX—the Interparliamentary EU Information Exchange, at least five trends may be identified with respect to the institutional relations between national parliaments and the European Union decision-making processes:
- national parliaments have a negligible impact on the decision-making process, in the very limited area originally delineated in Article 3 of Protocol 9;
- official documents tend to link the role of the national parliaments more to the scrutiny procedure on subsidiarity and proportionality (Protocol 30), rather than police and judicial cooperation;
- national parliaments have constantly expanded their scope of work, with respect to the EU decision-making process, based on Articles 4-7, within COSAC;
- national parliaments continue to face important (internal) institutional capacity shortcomings with respect to meeting the European Commission's deadlines related to various consultation procedures;
- national (lack of) coordination regarding the EU decision-making process, between the positions of parliaments and other domestic actors (notably the governments), is little conducive of effective implementation and/or enforcement of EU policies at Member State level.
To wit, in 2006, the national parliaments of the 25 Member States issued only 46 opinions (a mere 7% of the possible 650 total) on the Commission's 26 proposals for legislation (Newsletter 7). While the figure may be increasing, as contrasted with previous years, the direct dialog procedure between the Commission and the national parliaments, based on Article 3 of Protocol 9, is far from the desired impact. Notably, 18 of the 46 opinions came from the French Senate, while the French National Assembly also sent 1 opinion; but 13 of the 25 national parliaments never sent an opinion regarding legislative proposals throughout 2006. Very critically addressing the issue of subsidiarity and proportionality, British MP John Bercow (2003) emphasizes that “national parliaments could be simply overridden by the Commission” (24th Report) and, consequently, “democratically elected members of national parliaments would be impotent [. . .] about it” (Briefing Paper 3). Still, such emphasis on subsidiarity and proportionality, related to the future role of national parliaments, moves things ahead of time, towards the “early warning system” proposed through a new Protocol annexed to the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe—TECE. Such a move was also facilitated by the severe lack of proposals for legislation under the precise wording of Article 3 in Protocol 9—on the one hand, due to the expectation that TECE would be revived, in spite of the French and Dutch referenda of 2005; on the other hand, due to difficult/cumbersome decision-making procedures under the third pillar of the European Union, in matters of police and judicial cooperation.
During this time, however, COSAC expanded the cooperation mechanism and the scope of work of the national parliaments: Apart from the annual Speakers' Conferences or COSAC Chairpersons' Conferences, specific standing committees of the national parliaments meet in events that seem to mirror the style and agenda of the EU Councils of Ministers. Before the upcoming May 13-15 COSAC XXXVII, delegations from the national parliaments' standing committees have been meeting and discussing, only in 2007, matters concerning, respectively, foreign affairs, development, defense, finance & budget, and internal affairs. COSAC's 2006 Helsinki “Contribution” focused on five directions (cooperation with the Commission and Council; future of the European Union; the area of freedom, security & justice; enlargement; EU-Russia relations) that clearly show the national parliaments inclining rather towards the high-brow politics of the European Union, instead of fulfilling just the “meager” role provided in Protocol 9 and/or concentrating on the internal capacity and domestic coordination problems. According to a 2004 synthesis of domestic procedures concerning information flows on EU matters (legislative proposals, consultation and working documents) from governments to national parliaments, six of the 25 Member States still had no such provisions, whereas three were still debating the issue (Biannual Report 2). Domestic debates, in the national parliaments, over the Commission's Annual Policy Strategy (APS) and/or Legislative & Work Program (LWP) started only recently, only six of the 25 Member States reporting to have endeavored in this direction (Biannual Report 6).
National Context
Under such circumstances, what lessons should the Romanian Parliament learn with respect to fulfilling its role in the EU decision-making process? A brief overview of the situation points to a very slow start, with a mixed potential: Romania's bicameral Parliament decided in late December 2006 to create a joint standing committee on European affairs, replacing the former committees on European integration (Resolution 52). Article 148 of the Romanian Constitution provides that all matters concerning EU Treaty reforms shall be decided in a plenary session of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, by a two-thirds majority of all MPs; else, the Constitution is silent on any other EU matters. Consequently, the composition of the 35-member joint Committee on European Affairs (CAE) reflects not only the ratio of senators and deputies, but also the political representation resulted from the most recent round of elections (Article 2 of Resolution 52). The number of MPs on this Committee equals the number of MEPs wherewith Romania is represented in the European Parliament—9 of them are currently serving both capacities, until the Romanian Government organizes elections for the European Parliament, during the second half of 2007 (Hotnews.ro). CAE is responsible for exercising parliamentary control over the executive branch of government, in the area of European affairs. Subsequently, CAE is in charge of monitoring and controlling Romania's progress in implementing the provisions of the Accession Treaty, representing the Parliament in its relations with the European Union, participating in the debate concerning the future of Europe, and informing the Parliament as to EU's main strategies and policies. Notably, CAE is responsible for notifying the Parliament about the constitutional impact of intended Treaty reforms, as well as formulating Romania's position with respect to the adoption of any and all EU decisions and legislation (Article 5 of Resolution 52).
Therefore, considering the key role and mandate of the joint standing Committee on European Affairs, the analysis should further turn towards the actual work of CAE in Romania. Pursuant to Resolution 52/2006, CAE was supposed to adopt its own rules of procedure, by mid-January 2007 (Article 6); unfortunately, no such document is available, either on CAE's own webpage, or through the online legislative database of the Romanian Parliament. A similar search on IPEX reveals that, during 2007, since Romania's accession to EU, CAE submitted no scrutiny document or opinion. Moreover, the information and contacts concerning the Romanian Parliament's CAE on the websites and databases of COSAC, IPEX and the Speakers' Conference differ significantly. Also, CAE still has no permanent correspondent for COSAC, IPEX or the Commission—the names and email addresses of three staff persons are listed, in addition to those of five MPs (including CAE's chairperson), but their division of tasks and responsibilities is not clear. Surprisingly or not, tracking CAE's activity on the interactive website of the Romanian Parliament yields no results—no documents are available and no meetings appear to have been scheduled since the beginning of the year. Cross-referencing CAE's attributions with the 10 weekly, synthetic activity reports of 2007, available with the Chamber of Deputies' website, one finds no information concerning CAE's activity and sees no political opinions from CAE's membership. In the absence of such information, what should CAE do, in order to fulfill its mandate, as described above and laid down in Resolution 52?
Frendo (2002) is of the opinion that “rather than having national parliaments involved [. . .] at the European level, [. . .] we should ensure that national governments are subject to ex ante accountability to national parliaments and their relevant committees.” Such an opinion is consistent with CAE's first listed attribution, that of exercising parliamentary control over the executive in the area of European affairs (Article 5, letter a) of Resolution 52). The remaining attributions result from, and complement, a very unusual mandate given by the Romanian Parliament to CAE. COSAC official documents distinguish and differentiate two models of scrutiny in the national parliaments (Biannual Report 3): The document-based scrutiny system focuses on examining legislative and other documents emanating from the EU institutions, aims at formulating a clear position of the national parliament, as a whole, on the document under scrutiny, but does not necessarily seek to mandate the ministers' position at Council meetings. In such a system, the Committee on European Affairs normally acts as a smaller, quicker and (possibly) wiser filter, but the national parliament retains full decision-making power. In contrast, the mandating system of scrutiny implies that the national parliament delegates, in part or in total, the decision-making power to a Committee on European Affairs, with specific instructions regarding the scope and timing of activities, and maintains that Committee decisions within such a mandate have a binding character over the executive. Popa (1993) would argue that Romania's legal traditions, constitutional constraints and political culture required a document-based system of scrutiny. Yet, evidence in Resolution 52 points to the Romanian CAE being a prime example of the mandating system for all “regular” decisions in the EU, except Treaty reforms, where Parliament retains full powers, on a document-based system of scrutiny.
Lessons Learned
CAE is quite unusual for the Romanian Parliament—mandated scrutiny breaks with traditions; joint standing committees are rather the exception than the rule; the chairperson comes from the parliamentary opposition; deputies outnumber senators, in spite of the Senate having decision-making power with respect to international relations. No wonder CAE found it difficult to operate, to adopt rules of procedure, and/or recruit personnel and divide tasks or responsibilities! CAE's apparent lack of activity, however, should be interpreted more as an opportunity than a threat. While Romania's positions in the EU process of decision-making (both those of cabinet ministers and those of the national parliament) may be suffering dearly from the current lack of coordination, CAE is in the best position to promote a set of rules that would mainstream both the proactive coordination of policy formulation and the effective implementation of EU policies. From this perspective, then, a delay of 6-12 months (though shameful and unwanted) in organizing the Romanian CAE's workflow may well worth tantamount to 50 years of patient trial-and-error throughout the history of the European Union. In November 2004, COSAC briefly reviewed the (then) existing legislative-executive relations in the 25 Member States, and several lessons may be learned from the existing 11 mandate-based systems of scrutiny (Biannual Report 2). By the same token, Király (2005) compared and contrasted all methods of scrutiny in the 10 Member States that joined the Union in 2004, allowing for an informed selection of alternatives.
In essence, both CAE's domestic mandate and the European trend within COSAC invite to a very wide approach to European affairs. Clearly, widening the scope of CAE's work, in the absence of internal rules of procedure and/or appropriate staff, may not be conducive of effective impact—neither enhancing Romania's position in the Union, nor improving domestic implementation of EU policies. Király (2005) argues that national parliaments should “focus” on the entire policy process, in order to effectively scrutinize both EU policies and domestic policies. However, she glides, alongside COSAC, towards increasing and deepening interparliamentary cooperation (both at speakers and special committee levels), losing sight of the domestic monitoring dimension. Fortunately, CAE's attributions are very precise about controlling and mandating the cabinet ministers, and leave little room for creative interpretation in the direction of external relations—this latter function lies primarily with the Speakers of the Chamber and the Senate or other MPs, delegated by the Permanent Bureaus. Therefore, CAE is in position to coordinate three distinct mechanisms that feed and reinforce each-other, with respect to Romania's position on European affairs:
a) the issues on the EU agenda, apparent from the Commission's Annual Policy Strategies and Legislative & Work Plans, as well as each Council Presidency's priorities;
b) the positions of Romanian delegates, representatives, ministers, as well as MEPs, in the EU legislative process; and
c) the interests/aspirations of Romanian stakeholders with respect to transposition, implementation and enforcement, as apparent from the domestic consultation processes.
In spring 2006, Romania's Chamber of Deputies adopted an internal rule of procedure whereby civil society organizations (CSO) interested in the legislative process could register with the Public Relations Department of the Secretariat General, and thus have guaranteed access to standing committees, parliamentary groups, public hearings and other legislative events. CAE could easily use this register to consult with more than 100 CSOs on the EU agenda, in order to identify, annually,
i) the priorities of the most interested/proactive Romanian stakeholders,
ii) the level of convergence among the agendas/interests/aspirations of the Romanian CSOs,
cabinet ministers and special parliamentary committees, as well as
iii) the level of expertise among stakeholders proactively involved in EU matters.
Obviously, such course of action would also help identify independent experts on specific issues, allowing for a wider choice of individuals to be invited at the Commission's expert committees. Subsequently, via such experts, CAE would receive first-hand information, ahead of time, on the European Commission's intentions to regulate in a certain sector.
Once the domestic priorities are set, as a result of such consultation mechanism, CAE would be in position to plan ahead, and facilitate domestic (strategic) coordination, with special parliamentary committees in both chambers, with line ministries and/or governmental agencies, as well as with the most relevant CSOs. Such tripartite coordination would concentrate primarily on principles and objectives of the national position, the net result being that CAE would informally shape the mandate of the national delegation in the European Council's working groups/parties. At the same time, such tripartite coordination would reduce significantly the possibility that line ministries adopt positions that are detrimental to grassroot interests/stakeholders. Also, since various policy options and alternative solutions would be explored in such tripartite meetings, all stakeholders involved in the process would be fully aware of the calendar, consequences, costs and benefits of ensuing transposition, implementation and enforcement. Romanian legislation and public policies could finally get rid of the proverbial fragility that produced severe criticism from the European Commission and Parliament during the accession talks—apart from adopting 5,000+ normative acts per year, more than 60% of the Romanian legislative and policy documents deal with amending already adopted decisions (National Integrity System, 2005).
Conclusions & Perspectives
A wide mandate for CAE need not necessarily mean a heavy mandate, in terms of workload and paperflow. Given the anticipatory consultation of stakeholders and the strategic choices of the proposed tripartite meetings, adopted under CAE's aegis, opinions on specific legislative proposals, consultation and working documents (green or white papers and communications) coming from the European Commission would be issued a lot faster and preciser, allowing for increased levels of concertation among domestic actors (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Richardson, Gustafsson & Jordan, 1982). Henceforth, following the respective stages of the public policy cycle, CAE could act, indeed, as a nodal feedback point for the special committee meetings of COSAC (agenda setting), for the compromise and negotiation meetings of COREPER and/or the Council of Ministers (alternative solutions and decision making), for the specific work of Romanian MEPs in their Standing Committees of the European Parliament (decision making), and also for line ministries and parliamentary committees involved in transposition (implementation and evaluation). In this sense, CAE could take full advantage of the mandate-based system of scrutiny, leading and facilitating national coordination over the entire policy cycle.
Some prerequisites, however, should be considered in the near future, if such a plan were to be successful: Stakeholder consultation has a poor record in Romanian society—public administration units rarely observe the provisions of the transparency and access to information laws (52/2003 and 544/2001), and Parliament only last year adopted a regular public hearing procedure (Dragomirescu et al., 2007). Therefore, doubts still exist on whether the Parliament has the capacity to organize such consultations or whether MPs (including CAE members) are open enough to receive and digest conflicting opinions from stakeholders (Alexandru et al., 2006). Likewise, institutional communication and/or cooperation between the Romanian legislative and executive branches of government is traditionally weak, slow and inaccurate, especially when parliamentary control and/or leadership comes into question (National Integrity System, 2005). Most likely, the recently established European Affairs Department and Public Policies Unit (both under the authority of the Prime-Minister) would challenge CAE's “natural” leadership role and, thus, further impair/hinder inter-institutional communication (EU-RO Newsletter 14). Not in the least, CAE also needs a direct channel of communication with Romania's Permanent Representation to the European Union, if not a special representative in Brussels (Király, 2005).
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